In today's society, Global Mobile Networks (GLOMONETs) have become an important network infrastructure that provides seamless roaming service for mobile users when they leave their home network. Authentication is an essential mechanism for secure communication among the mobile user, home network, and foreign network in GLOMONET. Recently, Madhusudhan and Shashidhara presented a lightweight authentication protocol for roaming application in GLOMONET. However, we found their protocol not only has design flaws, but is also vulnerable to many attacks. To address these weaknesses, this paper proposes a novel authentication protocol with strong security for GLOMONET based on previous work. The fuzzy verifier technique makes the protocol free from smart card breach attack, while achieving the feature of local password change. Moreover, the computational intractability of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) guarantees the security of the session key. The security of the protocol is verified by the ProVerif tool. Compared with other related protocols, our protocol achieves a higher level of security at the expense of small increases in computational cost and communication cost. Therefore, it is more suitable for securing the roaming application in GLOMONET.
The arrangement of the remaining sections is as follows: Section 2 reviews the protocol in [32] and points out their design and security flaws; our protocol, the corresponding formal proof, and the formal verification by ProVerif are presented in Sections 3-5, respectively; Section 6 discusses the security properties and compares it with other related protocols; Section 7 summarizes the full paper.
Review and Cryptanalysis of Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's Protocol
In this section, Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] for GLOMONET is reviewed, and then, the design and security defects of their scheme are pointed out. For convenience of description, the notations used throughout the paper are listed in Table 1 . Their scheme [32] contained four phases, which were initialization, registration, authentication, and password change. Since the last phase was not involved in our analysis, only the first three phases were reviewed.
Initialization Phase
H A generates two large prime numbers p, q and chooses a generator g of Z * p . Besides, H A calculates n = p × q and φ(n) = (p − 1) × (q − 1). Then, H A chooses an integer e ∈ (1, φ(n)) and calculates d = e −1 mod φ(n), where gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1. Next, H A calculates and releases the public key y = g d mod n and retains {d, p, q} secretly.
Registration Phase
To register as a legitimate user, MU interacts with H A as follows:
Step 1. MU chooses identity ID MU , password PW MU , and produces a nonce N. Next, MU calculates R 1 = h(ID MU N) and submits it to H A securely. Step 2. Upon obtaining the registration request, H A calculates R = (R 1 ID H A d), a = h(d), C MU = (g a mod p) ⊕ h(R). Then, H A initializes the value of the counter K to zero and saves {K, R} in the database. Finally, H A submits {R, C MU , K, h(·)} to MU via a secret manner. Step 3. After getting the reply message from H A, MU computes K MU = h(ID MU PW MU R) and stores {K MU , R, C MU , K, h(·)} in the mobile device.
Authentication Phase
Whenever MU roams to a foreign network, the following steps allow FA and MU to achieve bidirectional authentication with the assistance of H A.
Step 1. MU types in ID MU and PW MU . The mobile device computes K * MU = h(ID MU PW MU R) and checks K * MU ? = K MU . The request is rejected if they are not equal. Otherwise, MU produces a nonce R MU and computes U = R ⊕ R MU , V = ((C MU ⊕ h(R)) ID FA ) ⊕ R MU and W = (U K (C MU ⊕ h(R))). Finally, MU submits the login request M 1 = {U, V, W} to FA.
Step 2. Upon receiving M 1 , FA produces a nonce R FA , and encrypts M 1 with R FA using K FH . Then, FA submits M 2 = {ID FA , E K FH (M 1 , R FA )} to H A.
Step 3. After obtaining M 2 , H A checks ID FA and finds the secret key K FH . Next, H A retrieves {U, V, W, R FA } by calculating D K FH (E K FH (M 1 , R FA )) and calculates a = h(d), R * MU = V ⊕ ((g a mod p) ID FA ), R * = U ⊕ R * MU . Then, H A checks if R * is preserved in the database. If so, H A calculates W * = (U K (g a mod p)) and checks W * ? = W. Non-equality results in the termination of the session, or else H A calculates SK = h(g a mod p) ⊕ R MU ⊕ R FA and submits M 3 = {E K FH (SK)} to FA.
Step 4. When getting M 3 , FA retrieves SK by calculating D K FH (E K FH (SK)) and computes X = h(SK R FA ). Then, FA forwards the message
and Shashidhara's scheme [32] ,
However, combined with the context, the formula should be SK * = h(C MU ⊕ h(R)) ⊕ R MU ⊕ R FA , and we correct it here.) and X * = h(SK * R FA ). Then, MU checks X * ? = X. The equality means FA is authenticated by MU.
Cryptanalysis of Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's Scheme
Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] had some design flaws, and these flaws would lead to some security weaknesses. We analyze the design and security defects of Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] in this section.
Transmitting Messages in Plaintext
As we know, the XOR and concatenation operations cannot protect the security of the message, and the different parts of message through these two operations can readily be extracted by an adversary A. In Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] , the message M 1 = {U, V, W} is directly transmitted after XOR and concatenation operations on the public channel, which means that these messages are transparent to A. We assume that A gets the messages M 1 = {U, V, W} and
Therefore, A can extract some secret information from M 1 due to it being transmitted in plaintext.
User Impersonation Attack
If A forges a login request message as the name of MU and the forged message passes the authentication of H A, we say that A successfully implemented the user impersonation attack. In Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] , as shown in Section 2.2.1, an adversary A can extract MU's information {(C MU ⊕ h(R)) = g a mod p, R, K}. As we can see from the review of Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] , this information was sufficient for A to impersonate as MU sends the login information to FA. To forge a login request, A produces a nonce R MU and calculates
). The forged message M 1 = {U , V , W } is a valid login request in the name of MU by using MU's corresponding secret information {R, (C MU ⊕ h(R)), K}. The forged login request M 1 can pass the authentication of FA and H A, and A can calculate SK by using (C MU ⊕ h(R)) in Step 5 of the authentication phase. Therefore, Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] is vulnerable to user impersonation attack.
Session Key Compromise Attack
In Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] , MU and FA share a session key SK = h(g a mod p) ⊕ R MU ⊕ R FA after the authentication, where R MU and R FA are two nonces produced by MU and FA, respectively. There are two design drawbacks on the session key. On the one hand, the shared session key should be generally calculated by MU and FA independently. In Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] , although both MU and FA contributed the session key, the value of SK was determined by H A, and FA cannot calculate the session key since it cannot get the contribution of MU. On the other hand, the session key was calculated only by XOR operations, and it is easily calculated by an adversary A. Assume that A has obtained the messages {M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , M 4 } by eavesdropping on the public channel. Next, A can extract g a mod p = C MU ⊕ h(R) and calculate R MU as shown in Section 2.2.1, as well as can get R FA from M 4 . Then, A can calculate the session key SK = h(g a mod p) ⊕ R MU ⊕ R FA of MU, FA, and H A. Therefore, in Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] , the session key is easily compromised just by eavesdropping the exchanged messages among MU, FA, and H A on the public channel.
Mobile Device Breach Attack
In the security analysis section of Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's protocol [32] , they claimed that their protocol could avoid off-line dictionary attack even if A obtained the information stored in MU's mobile device. However, user's identity and password are often easy to remember and have low entropy in real-life scenarios, and the dictionaries of identity and password are very limited. Therefore, Wang et al. [37, 38] pointed out that the data pair (ID, PW) can be guessed within polynomial time. We suppose that MU's mobile device information {K MU , R, C MU , K, h(·)} has been obtained by A, then the following offline steps can be used by A to guess MU's identity and password:
Step 1. A chooses a pair (ID * MU , PW * MU ) from the identity dictionary and password dictionary. Step 2. A calculates K * MU = h(ID * MU PW * MU R).
Step 3. A tests the correctness of (ID * MU , PW * MU ) by checking K * MU ? = K MU . Step 4. A repeats the above steps until the right pair (ID * MU , PW * MU ) is found.
Lack of Bidirectional Authentication
In the digital environment, the authentication between two parties often depends on whether the information provided by the two parties matches, i.e., one party verifies if the calculated value is equal to the value received from another party. Generally, a user authentication scheme should allow one participant to authenticate other participants in an explicit or implicit manner. In Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] , both FA and MU have not authenticated the validity of H A. When receiving M 3 = {E k FH (SK)} from H A in Step 3, FA just decrypts SK, but does not verify the validity of the message and H A. MU also does not authenticate H A. Therefore, Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] is not suitable for practical use due to it lacking the real bidirectional authentication.
Stolen Verifier Attack
In Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] , H A stores {K, R} as the verification information in the database for the each mobile user. As shown in Section 2.2.2, A can impersonate a mobile user if he/she knows MU's information {(C MU ⊕ h(R)), R, K}. Actually, the value (C MU ⊕ h(R)) for each mobile user is equal, and it is equal to g a mod p. As shown in Section 2.2.1, A can easily get g a mod p by eavesdropping the communication messages from the public channel. If the verifier was stolen by A, he/she can impersonate any mobile user by using {(C MU ⊕ h(R)) = g a mod p, R, K}. Therefore, Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] suffers from stolen verifier attack.
Other Weaknesses
In addition to the above security flaw, there are some other weaknesses in Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] . First, the counter mechanism is used in their scheme to resist the replay attack. Both MU and H A maintain a count value K synchronously, and H A judges the replay message by checking whether the received count value K equals the stored counter value. However, the authors did not explain how the two parties update the count value synchronously. Besides, the synchronization-based mechanism is vulnerable to asynchronous attack, and MU cannot access the server anymore if the updated K in MU does not match H A's. Second, there are some errors in their protocol's password change phase. In the description of their protocol, the mobile device MU computes K * MU = h(ID MU PW MU ) to check if the identity and password are correct, and K NEW MU = h(ID MU PW NEW MU ) to update the password. However, the correct formulas should be K * MU = h(ID MU PW MU K) and K NEW MU = h(ID MU PW NEW MU K).
Our Proposed Scheme
This section proposes a novel authentication protocol with strong security for GLOMONET based on the previous relevant work. In the protocol, the fuzzy verifier technique [39] is adopted to resolve the contradiction of local password change and stolen smart card attack. Besides, the Diffie-Hellman agreement method is used in the new protocol to secure the session key. Except the phases shown in Madhusudhan and Shashidhara's scheme [32] , our new protocol contains a session key update phase, which makes the protocol more practical.
Initialization Phase
H A initializes the system by selecting some parameters. H A chooses a large prime number p and a generator g of Z * p , where the DLP on Z * p is intractable. Next, H A selects a hash function h(·) : (0, 1) * → (0, 1) l , which transforms the arbitrary binary into l bit (such as 128 bits) data. Furthermore, H A chooses an integer 2 6 ≤ n 0 ≤ 2 8 , which is used for the fuzzy verifier. Besides, H A generates the secret and public key pair (x, X), where x ∈ Z * p and X = g x mod p. Finally, H A chooses a symmetric encryption algorithm E and the corresponding decryption algorithm D.
In addition to the generation of the above parameters, H A and FA have their identities ID H A and ID FA , respectively, and they share a secret key K HF by using the key exchange protocol.
Registration Phase
In this phase, MU interacts with the H A as follows to register as a legitimate user.
Step R1. MU ⇒ H A : {ID MU , HPW MU }:
MU first chooses ID MU , PW MU , and a nonce b. Then, MU calculates HPW MU = h(PW MU b) and transmits the registration request {ID MU , HPW MU } to H A with a secure method.
Step R2. H A ⇒ MU : A Smart Card SC: H A checks if ID MU exists in the system. If so, MU is asked to send a new one. Otherwise, H A computes A MU = h((h(ID MU ) ⊕ HPW MU ) mod n), K MH = h(ID MU x), and C MU = HPW MU ⊕ K MH . Then, H A stores the parameters {A MU , C MU , ID H A , p, g, X, E, D, h(·)} in a smart card (SC) and forwards it to MU over a secure manner.
Step R3. When obtaining the SC, MU activates it and stores b into it.
Login and Authentication Phase
Whenever MU roams to FA, the following steps allow FA and MU to achieve bidirectional authentication and share a session key with the assistance of H A. These procedures can also be found in Figure 1 .
Step V1. MU → FA:
MU inserts the SC into the mobile terminal and types in ID MU and PW MU . SC computes
Unequal means that MU entered incorrect ID MU or PW MU , and the session is terminated by SC. The card will be locked if there are three consecutive failures on the password. Otherwise, SC produces a nonce r MU ∈ Z * p and calculates R MU = g r MU mod p,
When receiving M 1 from a roaming user, FA produces a nonce r FA ∈ Z * p and computes R FA = g r FA mod p and C 4 = h(ID FA K HF R MU C 3 R FA ). Then, FA forwards the message
Unequal will lead to the rejection of the session. Otherwise, MU is authenticated by H A. Next, FA retrieves the K HF according to ID FA . Then, H A calculates C 4 = h(ID FA K HF R MU C 3 R FA ) and authenticates H A by checking
When receiving the message from H A, FA calculates C 5 = h(ID H A ID FA K HF R MU R FA ), and the validity of H A is verified if C 5 = C 5 . Then, FA calculates C 8 = R r FA MU mod p, the session key SK = h(R MU R FA C 8 ), and C 9 = h(SK C 7 ). Then, FA submits the message M 4 = {R FA , C 7 , C 9 } to MU.
Step V5. When receiving M 4 from FA, MU calculates D K MH (C 7 ) = (R FA C 6 ) and checks if R FA is equal to the received R FA . Then, MU calculates
, and the validity of FA is verified if C 9 = C 9 . Finally, as a shared session key between MU and FA, SK is used by them for further security communication.
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Inputs IDMU and PWMU, computes 
Session Key Update Phase
Since the session key is only valid for a certain period, MU should update the session key with FA if he/she wants continuous access to the roaming network. The following procedures allow him/her to update a new session key, and it also can be found in Figure 2 .
Step S1. MU produces a new nonce r MU ∈ Z * p and calculates R MU = g r MU mod p, C MU = E SK (R MU ). Then, MU submits {C MU } to FA for session key update.
Step S2. FA retrieves R MU by decrypting C MU using SK. Next, FA produces a new nonce r FA ∈ Z * p and calculates R FA = g r FA mod p,
Step S3. When receiving the message, MU first retrieves R FA by decrypting C FA using SK. Then, 
MU (Shared a session key SK) FA
Generates a random number r MU
Generates a random number r FA
Session key update phase.
Password Change Phase
The following steps allow MU to change the password without the assistance of the home agent H A.
Step P1. MU inserts the SC into the mobile terminal and types ID MU and PW MU .
Step P2. SC computes A MU = h((h(ID MU ) ⊕ h(PW MU b)) mod n) and verifies A MU ? = A MU . If they are not equal, which means that MU entered incorrect ID MU or PW MU , the request is rejected by SC. On the contrary, MU is asked to type a new password.
Step P3. MU inputs a new password PW * MU . SC calculates HPW *
Finally, SC replaces A MU and C MU with A * MU and C * MU , respectively.
Formal Proof

Basic Knowledge
G is a multiplicative group with a large prime order p, and g is its generator.
• DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem): Given g a ∈ G and a ∈ Z * p , it is hard to compute a. • CDHP (Computation Diffie-Hellman Problem): If a, b ∈ Z * p and g a , g b ∈ G are known, it is hard to compute g ab , and Adv CDH A denotes the probability for A to break the CDHP.
Basic Knowledge for the Proof
The formal proof given in here is based on [40] [41] [42] . To make it easy for A to perform attacks, we consider only three entities: one home agent H A, one foreign agent FA, and one mobile user MU. They make sessions in scheme S. I is for any entity that is not required to be differentiated. The entities have many instances, and each of them is numbered, as an oracle, e.g., MU i is the ith instance of MU. Similarly, we can understand I t , FA j and H A k . accept, reject, and ⊥ are three states for the result of the instance. accept occurs when the oracle receives the correct message; reject occurs when an incorrect message comes; and ⊥ occurs when no answer appears in the oracle. Each instance of MU or FA has a session number, like SN MU i or SN FA j , and a partner PN MU i or PN FA j . If SN MU i = SN FA j and they build the same session key sk, or sk MU i = sk FA j , we say that MU i and FA j are partnering, and PN MU i = FA j and PN FA j = MU i . g, p, ID MU , ID FA , and ID H A are public elements. The secret parameters, such as PW i , K FH , and x, are owned by the entities according to the scheme S. All passwords can be retrieved in a finite P set, which has |P| elements in total.
A can make the following queries on a simulator S to crack the login and authentication process, especially the session key:
• Send(I, I t r , m): I sends message m to I t r . If m is correct, the normal operations in S will be done on I t r ; or the query will be stopped. • Execute(MU i , FA j , H A k ): All messages in the authentication phase will be eavesdropped by A. • Reveal(I t ): If MU i or FA j generates a session key, the key will be returned to A.
A gets all long-term secret data of I, and this is for strong forward security [41] . • Test(I t ): I is for MU or FA. Finally, A has to choose a session to make a challenge. If I does not reach accept or s f s − security, which will be explained later, the result is ⊥. Else, a bit µ is chosen. If µ = 1, the session key is returned. Otherwise, a random string {0, 1} l is returned.
Some demonstrations must be listed below to complement the above content.
• SFS − f resh: As shown in [41] , it is Strong Forward Security-fresh for MU and FA. I t is SFS − f resh if any of the following conditions do not appear:
-
• SFS − secure: The advantage for A breaking S is the probability of correctly guessing µ generated in Test(I t ) over 1 2 , or Adv SFS
Process of the Proof
Theorem 1. A multiplicative group G with a large order p, a finite password set with size P, and the security length l are basic parameters for the proof. The adversary A has chances for q s Send queries, q e Execute queries, and q h hash queries to crack S, with the upper bound polynomial time t. The advantage of breaking the SFS − secure scheme S is:
T m represents the time of a multiplication in G and t = t + (6q e + 2q s )T m .
Proof. The proof contains a sequence of games from G 0 to G 5 . Succ i denotes A's successful probability to guess µ correctly. Since there is only one MU, no guessing is required for the identity.
• Game G 0 : The random oracles are added in the real scheme. If more queries are used by A or the game is finished, but without answer, a new bit µ is produced. We know that Adv SFS
Game G 1 : All queries in Section 4.2 are brought in. However, there are five Send queries:
and Send(FA j , MU i , M 4 ). The operations for five Send queries correspond to the five steps in Section 3.3. Furthermore, three lists are required: L h is to store the results of hash queries from the simulator S; L A is to store the hash queries from A; L S is to store the transcripts of the sessions. When a string str is asked for the hash result, the simulator S returns the result r if the tuple (str, r) can be found in the list. However, if there is no such result, the simulator S picks up a random string r ∈ {0, 1} l as the result and stores the tuple (str, r) in the corresponding list. A cannot know the difference between G 1 and G 0 , and Pr[Succ 1 ] = Pr[Succ 0 ].
• Game G 2 : The collisions between different sessions are discussed in this game. There are two cases below:
1.
The probability for collision of random numbers r MU and r FA is at most (q s +q e ) 2 2(p−1) .
2.
The probability for collision of hash results is
We consider the case that A can impersonate the entities via forging hash results without hash query.
- Therefore, G 3 is the same as G 2 , and the probability |Pr[
We inject the CDH problem in this game, with random oracles added again. Based on [41, 42] , Corrupt(MU i , SC) must be asked first to crack the scheme. Two cases can be listed:
1.
With the most number of chance q s , A can select one password from P to start a session. Such an active attack has the success probability q s |P| .
2.
For passive attacks, two subcases are demonstrated below:
(a) Execute queries are used. Finally, (g r MU ||g r FA ||g r MU r FA , sk) should be found in L A , and the probability is 1 q h . Therefore, the probability for this subcase is q h Adv CDH
Execute can be replaced with the combination of all Send queries. Similar to the last subcase, the probability is q h Adv CDH Via the above games, Theorem 1 can be deduced.
Formal Verification by ProVerif
In this section, the emulator tool ProVerif is utilized by us to test the security of the proposed protocol, which is a new and efficient tool to detect the confidentiality of an information security protocol. The tool supports unlimited rounds of protocol execution.
The normalized mode description about our protocol is presented as follows. There are three entities, which are MU, FA, and H A, in the protocol. Firstly, MU sends the registration request to H A. Secondly, H A transmits the information to MU in a secure manner. Thirdly, MU sends the login request to FA. Fourthly, FA forwards the message to H A. Then, H A tightly transmits the response to FA. Lastly, FA returns the message to H A.
The detail of the code is shown in the following. The predefinition code in Figure 3 consists by three parts, and we firstly declare some statements (parameters, space and functions) and channels (secure and unsecure channel). Then, we define some equations (hash function, XOR operation, and the inverse operation of ). We also make some queries to satisfy the security requirements. The processes of MU, FA, and HA were operated simultaneously, and the corresponding codes are shown in Figures 4-6 , respectively. In summary, As shown in Figure 7 , we state the protocol by using events BeginUser(muID) and EndUser(muID), and the verification results are "RESULT not attacker(SK[]) is true.", "RESULT not attacker(KHF[]) is true.", "RESULT not attacker(KMH'[]) is true.", and "RESULT inj-event(EndUser(id)) ==> inj-event(BeginUser(id)) is true.". Thus, the session key SK, the shared key K HF , and the shared key K MH could withstand the attacks, and the proposed protocol could pass the verification of ProVerif. (*------MU process-------*) let mu= new N: bitstring; new Breg: bitstring; let muPW = H(Concat(pw, nouceb)) in out(sch, (muID,muPW)); ! ( event BeginUser(muID); in(sch,(AMU:bitstring,CMU:bitstring,HAID:bitstring,p:bitstring,g:bitstring,pubX:bitstring,key:bitstring)); let AMU'=H(xor(H(muID),H (Concat(pw,nouceb) ))) in if AMU'=AMU then new Rmu:bitstring ; let RMU=pow(g,Rmu) in let pubX=pow(g,x) in let C1=pow(pubX,Rmu) in let CIDmu=xor(muID,H(Concat(Rmu,C1))) in let Kmh'=xor(CMU,H(Concat(pw,nouceb))) in let C2=H(Concat(HAID,Concat(FAID,C1))) in let C3=senc(C2,key) in out(ch,(HAID,CIDmu,RMU,C3)); event EndUser(muID); in(ch,(RFA:bitstring,C7:bitstring,C9:bitstring)); let C6'=H(Concat(Concat(xor(CIDmu,H(Concat(RMU,C1))),FAID),Concat(C1,RFA))) in let Rfa'=sub(sdec(C7,key),C6') in if Rfa'=RFA then let C6"=H(Concat(Concat(muID,FAID),Concat(C1,RFA))) in if C6"=C6' then let C8'=pow(RFA,Rmu) in let SK'=H(Concat(Concat(Rmu,RFA),C8')) in let C9'=H(Concat(SK',C7)) in if C9=C9' then 0 ). (*------FA process-------*) let FA= out(sch,(KHF)); ! ( in(ch,(HAID:bitstring,CIDmu:bitstring,RMU:bitstring,C3:bitstring)); new rFA:bitstring; let RFA=pow(g,rFA) in let C4=H(Concat(Concat(FAID,KHF),Concat(RMU,Concat(C3,RFA)))) in out(ch,(CIDmu,RMU,C3,RFA,C4,FAID)); in(ch,(C5:bitstring,C7:bitstring)); let C5'=H(Concat (Concat(HAID,FAID) ,Concat(KHF,Concat(RMU,Concat(RFA,HAID))))) in if C5=C5' then let C8=pow(RMU,rFA) in let SK=H(Concat(RMU,Concat(RFA,C8))) in let C9=H(Concat(SK,C7)) in out(ch,(RFA,C7,C9)); 0 ). (*------HA process-------*) let HA= ! ( in(sch, (muID:bitstring,muPW:bitstring)); let AMU=H(xor(H(muID),muPW)) in let key=H(Concat(muID,x)) in let CMU=xor(muPW,key) in out(sch,(AMU,CMU,HAID,p,g,pubX,key)); in(ch,(CIDmu:bitstring,RMU:bitstring,C3:bitstring,RFA:bitstring,C4:bitstring,FAID:bitstring)); let C1'=pow(RMU,x) in let MUID'=xor(CIDmu,H(Concat(RMU,C1'))) in let KMH"=H(Concat(MUID',x)) in let DKMH"=sdec(C3,KMH") in let C2'=sub(DKMH",FAID) in let C2"=H(Concat(HAID,Concat(FAID,C1'))) in if C2'=C2" then in(sch,(KHF:bitstring)); let C4'=H(Concat(Concat(FAID,KHF),Concat(RMU,Concat(C3,RFA)))) in if C4=C4' then let C5=H(Concat(Concat(Concat(HAID,FAID),KHF),Concat(RMU,RFA))) in let C6=H(Concat(Concat(muID,FAID),Concat(C1',RFA))) in let C7=senc(Concat(RFA,C6),KMH") in out(ch,(C5,C7)); 0 ). process ( mu|FA|HA) 
Security Analysis and Comparisons
To show the advantages of our protocol, security features of our protocol are discussed in this part. Besides, the comparisons of our protocol and other related protocols are also given in this section.
Resist Smart Card Loss (Off-Line Password Guessing) Attack
To achieve the feature of freely local password update for users, the smart card must store verification information of user's identity and password. However, this verification information can be used to guess a password if the smart card is lost. Our scheme uses the fuzzy verifier technique [39] to resist smart card loss attack while realizing local password change. If MU's SC is lost, A can retrieve the information in SC {A MU , C MU , ID H A , p, g, X, E, D, b, h(·)}. However, A cannot guess ID MU and PW MU from C MU without knowing H A's secret key x. A may also want to guess ID and PW from A MU = h((h(ID MU ) ⊕ h(PW MU b)) mod n). However, for 10 6 sized identity/password dictionaries, and n 0 ≈ 2 8 , there are more than 2 30 pairs of (ID MU , PW MU ) such that the value of h((h(ID MU ) ⊕ h(PW MU b)) mod n) equals A MU . Therefore, it is impossible for A to obtain the correct (ID MU , PW MU ). According to the above analysis, it can be seen that our protocol can resist smart card loss attack, and A cannot guess the user's correct (ID MU , PW MU ) even if A obtained the smart card information.
User Anonymity
In our protocol, ID MU is not included in any of communication messages M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , and M 4 . Among these messages transmitted on the public channel, just CID MU is related to ID MU . Only H A can reveal ID MU from CID MU by using the secret key x, and A cannot know ID MU from the messages obtained on the public channel. Meanwhile, in each session, the messages M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , and M 4 exchanged among the three parties, all elements except ID H A are dynamically changed with the random numbers. Therefore, A cannot track different sessions from the same mobile user. Therefore, our protocol can protect the user's anonymity.
Proper Bidirectional Authentication
Our protocol achieves the bidirectional authentication among MU, FA, and H A with the assistance of H A. The bidirectional authentication between MU and H A relies on the shared secret information K MH = h(ID MU x), which can be retrieved by MU with the PW MU from C MU and also can be calculated by H A when he/she retrieves the correct ID MU from CID MU using x. With the shared 
Resist Impersonation Attack
In our protocol, the secret keys x and K HF are indispensable for H A to authenticate mobile users and FA. Therefore, any adversary cannot imitate H A. For the same reason, the adversary cannot impersonate FA. Besides, based on the description of the authentication phase, ID MU and PW MU are essential for MU to generate a valid login request message. However, as we can see from Section 6.1, an adversary A cannot guess MU's ID MU and PW MU even if A has obtained the user's smart card. Therefore, our protocol can avoid user impersonation attack.
Session Key Security
After the bidirectional authentication, a session key SK = h(g r MU g r FA g r MU ·r FA ) (we omit the modular exponential operations here) is shared between MU and FA, which includes contributions from both MU and FA. SK is secure due to the intractability of the DLP; no adversary, even H A, can calculate the SK without knowing r MU or r FA . Besides, since SK is independent of the master secret key x, it is still secure even though x is compromised. Therefore, the forward secrecy feature is achieved. Furthermore, the session key depends on the nonce generated by MU and FA, which dynamically change with different sessions. Therefore, the compromise of one session key would not deduce the compromise of other session keys, and our protocol guarantees the feature of known-key secrecy.
Resist Insider Attack
In our protocol's registration phase, the mobile user MU submits HPW MU = h(PW MU b) to H A for registration. Even if the privileged insider gets the registration information {ID MU , HPW MU }, he/she still cannot reveal MU's real identity ID MU since it is hidden by the random number b. Therefore, our protocol resists insider attack.
Secure Session Key Update
Session key update is an important function for a mobile user if he/she wants to access the foreign network continuously. Our protocol allows MU and FA to generate securely a new session key based on their current session key. Since our key agreement mechanism is similar to the DHP, we have adjusted the mechanism to avoid the man-in-the-middle attack. MU and FA generate the new shares R MU and R FA and transmit the encrypted share C MU = E SK (R MU ) and C FA = E SK (R FA ) to each other. An adversary A cannot obtain their real shares without knowing the current session key SK, and our protocol allows the two parties to update their session key securely.
Comparison with Other Related Protocols
To demonstrate the robustness and advantages of our protocol, the features of our protocol and other relevant protocols [30, 32] are compared in this section.
First, the function and security features of our protocol and the protocols in [30, 32] are evaluated, and the result is shown in Table 2 . As can be seen from the table, both protocols in [30, 32] failed to provide forward secrecy and session key update and were vulnerable to stolen verifier attack. Except for their common defects, the protocol in [30] cannot realize the function of local password change for a mobile user, while the protocol in [32] was also vulnerable to mobile device breach attack and user impersonation attack and cannot provide bidirectional authentication and session key security. Unlike the previous work, our protocol resisted all known attacks and provided some ideal functions. The fuzzy verifier technique resolved the contradiction of local password change and smart card breach attack. Besides, the modular exponential operation based on DLP guaranteed the security of session key. Therefore, our protocol was better than the related protocols on security and functions. Next, we evaluate the computation complexity and the storage cost of our protocol and the protocols in [30, 32] . In order to facilitate the description, let T h , T me , and T e represent the computation cost of a hash function, a modular exponential, and a symmetric encryption/decryption operation, respectively. To evaluate the computation cost, we used the computation costs for related cryptographic operations in [43] on platform Intel(R) T5870 2.00 GHz, which were T h = 2.580 µs, T me = 10.257 ms, and T e = 2.012 µs, respectively. Table 3 shows the result of the performance comparison, from which we can see that our protocol just needed a few more modular exponential operations than the protocols in [30, 32] . The total computational cost for a session of our protocol was about 61.6 ms, and it was also at a very efficient level. It was precisely because of these increased computational cost that our protocol surpassed other related work [30, 32] in terms of security and function. Our protocol not only guaranteed the security of the session key, but also balanced the contradiction between local password change and stolen smart card attack. Therefore, the increased computational cost was worthwhile, and it enhanced the security of the protocol. Furthermore, we compared the MU side's storage cost of three protocols and omitted the storage cost of H A and FA since the servers both had adequate storage space. Compared with other protocols [30, 32] , the storage requirements of MU in our protocol was somewhere in between, and it also can be seen in Table 3 . Finally, we evaluated the communication complexity of our protocol and the protocols in [30, 32] . For comparison purposes, let L ID , L h , L r , L T , L S , and L p represent the bit lengths of identity, hash function, random number, timestamps, symmetric cryptography, and large prime number, respectively, and we assumed they were 80 bits, 160 bits, 160 bits, 80 bits, 128 bits, and 1024 bits, respectively. We counted the communication cost of one session for the three protocols, and the comparison result is shown in Table 4 . From the table, we can see that our protocol had a lesser increase in communication cost to achieve higher security. 
Conclusions
This paper focused on the user authentication mechanism in GLOMONET. Firstly, some design and security weaknesses of the user authentication protocol in [32] were pointed out. Their protocol had a fatal flaw that some important information of the mobile user was transmitted via the public channel in plaintext, and it can be easily obtained by an adversary. Therefore, their protocol suffered from stolen verifier attack, user impersonate attack, session key compromise attack, and mobile device breach attack. Secondly, we proposed a novel user authentication protocol with strong security for GLOMONET. The use of the fuzzy verifier technique ensured that the proposed protocol resisted the smart card loss attack while achieving the feature of local password update. Besides, the proposal was based on the Diffie-Hellman Protocol (DHP) under the discrete logarithm, which not only ensured the security of session key, but also enabled our protocol to achieve the function of secure session key agreement. Compared with other relevant protocols, our protocol achieved a higher level of security with a small amount of increased computation and communication, and it was more suitable for the GLOMONET environment. 
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